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From labour contractors to worker-agents:  
Transformations in the recruitment  
of migrant labourers in India 
 
 
Jayaseelan Raj and Richard Axelby 
 
This article examines the circumstances, in which the tasks performed by professional 
labour contractors may be passed on to worker-agents. It does so by critically engaging 
with the experience of migrant workers from the eastern Indian state of Jharkhand as 
they travel to work in the Peermade tea belt in the south Indian state of Kerala. 
Specifically, we identify shifts in economic and political contexts that have permitted 
these functions to pass from labour contractors to workers-agents and from a sardari 
(top-down) to a ristedari (kinship based) system. Outlining the functions of the labour 
contractor—as bridge, broker and buffer—the article details the complex processes and 
the series of negotiations that occur during the transition from labour contractor to 
worker-agent-led recruitment and the implications of this shift for labour relations in 
the production setting. We conclude by calling for further consideration of the ‘worker-
agent’ as a key emerging figure in understanding the contemporary transformations in 
the reproduction of footloose migrant labour, which may have larger ramifications for 
other contexts in South Asia and beyond. 
 
Keywords: migrant labour, labour contractor, worker-agent, plantation, India  
 
I 
Introduction 
One chilly morning in early 2015, the usual tranquillity of the Hill View Estate in Kerala’s 
Peermade tea belt was broken by the arrival of Thomas—a Syrian Christian from the valley 
town of Thodupuzha. For more than a year, Thomas had been making a handsome income by 
delivering migrant workers from Jharkhand to the AUBURN Company which owns the Hill 
View. Now, Thomas’s position as a labour contractor—together with the income that came 
with it—was under threat. Bypassing the established Tamil workforce’s homes, Thomas 
rushed straight to the line houses where his Jharkhandi workers had been staying. An 
argument ensued with accusations and counteraccusations thrown back and forth. Thomas 
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threatened the workers of dire consequences—if their complaints continued, he would ensure 
that they never find work in Kerala again. Hearing this, the workers laughed, and a 
humiliated Thomas was roughly pushed out of the house. Those who had previously referred 
to him as saab (sir) were now abusing him, both verbally and physically. Though he did not 
yet know it, the workers he had recruited were now actively plotting to usurp Thomas’s 
position as the supplier of migrant labour to the plantation. 
To those familiar with circular or seasonal migration in India, Thomas is an 
immediately recognisable figure. The growing scholarly literature on labour migration 
properly recognises the contribution of professional sub-contractors (i.e. those who bid to 
perform a task and employ labourers to carry it out) and labour agents (who supply labourers 
to employers in return for a commission/fee). Mediating between labour and capital, these 
actors are central to the organisation of migration for work. This article, however, focuses on 
a third category of mediator—that of the ‘worker-agent’—a figure, who supplements wages 
from manual work with a marginal commission paid by an employer or intermediary in return 
for recruiting others to the same work site. In contrast to professional contractors and labour 
agents, these worker-agents rely on kinship and friendship networks to find fellow workers to 
work alongside them. A number of studies have discussed the ways, in which migrant 
workers’ friendship and kinship networks support migration (e.g. Carrier 1992; Bolt 2015; 
Barrientos 2013), but precisely how the event of worker-led recruitment unfolds within 
micro-level social contexts, remains unexamined. Furthermore, the processes of recruitment 
by professional labour contractors and by the workers themselves exist side by side in most 
of the narratives. In other words, in these accounts, one form of recruitment does not replace 
the other. This is contrary to the situation discussed here, where the labour contractor is 
replaced by the worker-agent, whose attempt to establish hierarchical relationship with the 
labourers is strongly resisted by the fellow workers. 
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This article critically engages with the experience of migrant workers from the eastern 
Indian state of Jharkhand as they travel to work in the Peermade tea belt in the south Indian 
state of Kerala.1 Based on the ethnographic analysis of micro-level social contexts, it details 
the complex processes and series of negotiations that occur during the transition from labour 
contractor to worker-agent recruitment and the implications of this shift for labour relations 
in the production setting. One of the observations we make is of the dependence of worker-
agent-led recruitment on non-hierarchical, egalitarian sets of social relations. This is in 
contrast to professional labour contractors who also supervise and pay workers (Chakrabarty 
1989; Chandavarkar 1994). Therefore, our worker-agents are quite different from the 
professional labour contractors, including the colonial kangani2 and sardar3, who depend 
upon a clear hierarchical division from recruited workers. We also observe that the ‘decline 
of the regular worker’ (Parry 2018: 5) is a major factor for the replacement of the hierarchical 
labour contractor by the egalitarian worker-agent, as well as for the maintenance of relations 
of relative equality between the workers and the worker-agents that recruit them. This is 
evident as we compare changes in the various functions—bridging, brokering and 
buffering—performed by different kinds of labour contractors.  
II 
Migrant labourers and their contractors 
A growing scholarly literature has examined the drivers and patterns of internal migration in 
India and the conditions under which migrant labourers work (see Deshingkar and Farrington 
	
1 The research for this article was carried out in Kerala from 2014–16 (Raj) and in Jharkhand 
in 2016 (Raj and Axelby) and involved a combination of participatory observation, collection 
of genealogical histories of migrant families, and detailed interviews with workers, 
employers and contractors. 
 
2 The term ‘kangani’ refers to the labour contractors-cum-supervisors—usually Tamils—who 
would recruit workers from their own regions. 
 
3 Labour recruiters-cum-supervisors. 
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2009; Breman et al 2009; De Haan and Rogaly 2002). There are also detailed ethnographies 
on communities whose histories are significantly related to migrant labour. Breman (1985 and 
1996), Mosse (et al 2002; 2005) and Breman et al (2009) have recognised the centrality of 
migration respectively in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. Some understand 
migrants as part of a broader system of exploitation and oppression under capitalist 
production (Breman 1985 and 1996; Bourgois 1989); they also emphasise the unfree (neo-
bonded), casual, and precarious nature of migrant labour (Guerin et al 2009; Raj 2014; Parry 
2018). Others pay attention to the ability of workers to exercise forms of agency when 
negotiating the terms of their engagement (Lal 1989; Mosse et al 2002; De Neve 2014). 
A key figure in South Asian labour migration is the professional labour contractor, 
who operates through formal as well as informal networks to facilitate the kinds of informal, 
temporary and flexible employment practices that have fuelled the Indian economic boom. 
Though there is no commonly agreed definition of labour contracting, it is generally 
associated with what the ILO (International Labour Organization) terms, a ‘triangular 
employment relationship’, in which the direct employer is differentiated from the person or 
company for whom work is carried out (Barrientos 2013). That this definition covers a range 
of sub-contracting possibilities is reflected in the variety of titles which attach to it: third-party 
labour contractor, recruitment agent, labour intermediary, gang-leader, and jobber. With 
regard to their role directing labour migration, contractors may appear as exploitative 
gangmasters (Breman 1985 and 2003) or as vulnerable and precarious brokers (Picherit 2009), 
who provide vital services to workers under their employers (Mosse 2005). 
Historical accounts of labour recruitment to plantations and industrial towns have 
recognised the significance of kinship networks and the way the labour contractors used them 
to operate the chain of labour procurement (Carrier 1992; Heidemann 1992; Chandavarkar 
1994). The literature also discusses the transformations in recruitment arrangements, for 
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example, from the indentured to the Kangani system4. While the indenture system used a 
chain of officials and contractors in procuring labour, it was much more personalised and 
localised in the subsequent Kangani labour regime in which workers were commonly 
recruited from the same village as the kangani who used personal ties and regional solidarity 
with the workers to assert their authority (Raj 2014). This also resonates with the 
contemporary literature on the use of kin morality by the employer-cum-recruiters, as argued 
by Geert De Neve (2008) in the case of dyeing industry in Tamil Nadu. De Neve shows how 
the employers-cum-recruiters evoke moralities of kinship in the shop floor to inculcate a sense 
of commitment among the workers in order to secure a stable labour force. Such attempts 
become futile when the workers often choose other employers who pay them more, thus 
overriding the morality of kinship. At the same time, kin-like relations and obligations may 
develop within the workplace among migrant workers as a support system to deal with their 
alienation, as recognised by Bolt (2015) in the case of Zambian migrants to South African 
fruit farms. Bolt also examines how various forms of labour procurement exist side by side, 
including the personalised labour recruitment coordinated by black foremen. James Carrier 
(1992) discusses the way that family networks that had previously ordered work in cottage 
industries were reoriented to generate recruitment to English mills. Drawing on these 
historical and anthropological narratives, in this article, we develop the distinction between 
the labour contractors and the workers who recruit fellow workers. In particular, we draw 
attention to the forms of power, knowledge and authority they deploy, and the processes, by 
which, in the case of Kerala’s Peermade tea plantations, one has replaced the other. 
 
 
 
	
4 See Heidemann (1992). 
JAYASEELAN RAJ AND RICHARD AXELBY	
	
	
III 
Bridge, broker and buffer: The functions of the labour contractor 
In scholarly literature, contractors appear variously as exploitative gangmasters (Breman 1985 
and 2004) or as precarious middlemen (Picherit 2009) who are central to labour migration 
(Mosse 2005). Here we open up these binaries to consider how labour contractors fulfil three 
distinct but complementary roles—that of bridge, that of broker, and that of buffer. 
 
Bridge  
The ability of contractors to derive profit from organising migration lies in the inequalities of 
knowledge about possibilities in different sectors and regions. The ‘bridge’ aspect is most 
significant at the initial stage of the recruitment process, when workers are unaware of new 
sources of employment and employers are unaware of the availability of labour (Kooiman 
1977). Contractors can offer knowledge about reliable workers to potential employers while at 
the same time providing workers with information about employment opportunities (Mosse 
2005). This aspect of the contractor’s role is underpinned by acts of translation: organising 
travel to distant locations and arranging shelter, food and employment for migrants in 
unfamiliar locations, and with people who do not share a common local language. Thus, a 
contractor is able to maintain their position, space and status by mediating knowledge over 
employment possibilities.5 But, if we accept that the contractor’s role is to facilitate the initial 
connection of capital and labour, then, once relations are established, we would expect the 
	
5Among historians of capitalist agriculture labour contracting is seen to play a crucial part in 
the early development of rural labour markets (Brass 2004: 316). Following the idea of a 
dual-economy model, contractors provide the bridge that links workers in the low-paid 
traditional agricultural sectors to employers in advanced industrial and capitalist agriculture 
sectors. The logical conclusion of this argument is that once capitalist agriculture has 
established itself ‘the labour contractor then simply vanishes from the historical stage’ (ibid.). 
This is not a view to which Brass himself subscribes. To him: ‘the role of the gangmaster is a 
systemic one, reproduced by capitalism itself’ (ibid. 321). 
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contractor to no longer be required. To ensure their longevity, this initial ‘bridging’ role must 
be combined with other functions. 
 
Broker 
After the initial stage, a contractor must maintain their position by mediating between the 
demands of labour and capital. Success depends on continually attracting and retaining a 
reliable supply of workers which can be managed to meet employers’ variable demands for 
migrant labour. Navigating concentrations of production in manufacture and seasonality in 
agriculture, labour contractors must be able to match the peaks and troughs in demand which 
local labour markets are unable to manage. Barrientos describes how labour contracting 
serves the needs of contemporary capitalism by reducing the transaction costs of finding and 
recruiting appropriate workers at the right time and maximising the efficiency of labour use 
on an ‘as need’ basis (2013: 1066). Turning to their workers, a contractor must strike a 
balance between rates of pay sufficiently attractive to maintain recruits, while low enough to 
undercut labour markets in the receiving locality and also to extract a profit from the 
operation. Contractors maintain supply using a range of inducements including credit and 
advances against future work. Contractors also utilise uncertainty and precarity to stifle 
protests and bind workers to them—only by conforming will workers gain future employment 
opportunities (Breman 2003). However, managing demand and supply of labour is a delicate 
balancing act: in those markets subject to periodic peaks and troughs, the labour contractor’s 
position is highly vulnerable. 
The major difference between the ‘bridge’ and the ‘broker’ roles is that the former is 
the key in the early stage of migration while the latter aspect gains prominence when there is a 
need to manage supply in accordance with the production requirements of a given period. 
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However, as the third and final function reveals, there is more to the role of the contractor 
than being just a neutral ‘finding-agency’ for labour. 
 
Buffer 
Brass writes of labour contracting as working to ‘maintain or improve control over (and 
thereby cheapen the cost of) their workers by means of coercion’ (2004: 315–16). Here, we 
see how labour contractors serve a third function that is highly conducive to capitalist 
production relations—that of a buffer, by which employers are able to maintain some 
separation from workers. There is a degree of ambiguity about the position of workers 
delivered to an employer by a contractor; and the ultimate employer is able to exploit this 
ambiguity in a number of ways. The opaque nature of the relationship between employers and 
workers benefits the former at expense of latter by allowing them to avoid legal requirements 
over—pay, conditions of employment and social provisions (Barrientos 2008: 982). Breman 
talks of migrant workers as being ‘outside of the law [and] beyond the benign reach of state 
agencies’; this makes them particularly vulnerable to ‘repression and exploitation in a 
capitalist framework remarkable for its nakedness and rawness’ (2003: 284). This distancing 
of the ultimate employer soothes out potential resistance and allows for the engagement of 
migrant workers on a casual basis, in which workers are denied the labour rights that would 
normally be due to them.  
 
A precarious balance 
The performance of labour contracting is a function of the types of labour and commodity 
markets which they serve. As such, the relative importance of the different elements—the 
balance of bridge against broker against buffer—is determined by the position of workers, the 
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needs of employers and the wider legal and political context. Each of these facets of the 
contractor’s function also depends on the deployment of particular kinds of knowledge. As 
bridge, the contractor must have knowledge of potential workers and potential employers; as 
broker, they must use their knowledge of labour markets to meet peaks and troughs in the 
supply and demand for labour; the performance of the buffer role requires the obscuring of 
information—keeping knowledge both from the workers themselves and from those seeking 
to assist workers in claiming their legal entitlements. 
The position of labour contractor is not inevitable and permanent. We explore here the 
circumstances, in which the labour contractor becomes dispensable. While labour contractors 
may be important in establishing contact between workers in one location and employers in 
another, in the ethnographic case we relate in this article, the contractor is only a temporary 
conduit that ultimately is replaced by another figure—that of the worker-agent. To understand 
the respective roles of workers and contractors, we must situate them properly in the complex 
economic and social realities, in which they operate. The next section looks at the 
transformation over time of the types of relationships—both vertical and horizontal—which 
facilitate migration out of villages in Dumka District in the eastern Indian state of Jharkhand. 
We do so by first offering a survey of migration history, household economy and social 
relations in a village, which we will call Jharatti, which lies north of Dumka town, close to the 
border with Godda District.  
 
IV 
The significance of migration in Jharkhand’s Dumka District 
Ashok Rana, a 50-year-old migrant worker, was standing proudly outside his newly built 
concrete family home in Jharatti village when we visited him. The house’s construction had 
taken three years and had cost about 500,000 rupees. Inside, there was a TV and a music 
player, while outside rested the shiny new motorbike, which formed part of the marriage 
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dowry for Ashok’s eldest daughter. How was Ashok Rana able to afford all this in a region, 
where the average daily wage for unskilled labourers was less than 150 rupees per day? The 
kutcha (unpaved) road in front of Ashok Rana’s house connects to a metalled rural lane, 
which leads to a well-built highway, which is further linked to the national rail network at 
Jasidih Junction. For more than 20 years, Ashok Rana has followed this well-trodden route, 
initially to Kashmir to build mountain roads, and more recently— accompanying his wife and 
sons—to Kerala, where they work on tea plantations. The knowledge gained over this period 
had now allowed Ashok to upgrade his role as a migrant worker to combine it with organising 
the migration of others. Jharkhand, one of the newer states of the Indian Union, came into 
existence in November 2000, when the erstwhile bigger state of Bihar was bifurcated. Located 
in the north-east of Jharkhand, the District of Dumka lies in the broad and undulating strip of 
hilly country that separates West Bengal from Bihar. This area of Jharkhand stands in 
dramatic contrast to the rich agricultural plains of the neighbouring states. In earlier centuries, 
Dumka was thickly forested; though this has been steadily lost—first to submergence with the 
damming of the Mayurakshi river in the 1950s, then to mining with the huge Rajmahal coal 
mine project conceived in the early 1980s, and more recently, through the open-cast gravel 
mining that blights whole swathes of the countryside. Despite the vast mineral wealth lying 
beneath their feet, the people of Dumka remain among the very poorest in India. In Dumka, 
93 per cent of the population remains rural, and the average literacy rate stands at 61 per cent 
according to the 2011 Census of India (Government of India 2011). In 2006, the Indian 
government listed Dumka amongst the country’s 250 most backward districts.6 The 
designation of the area as a ‘backward region’ is so rooted that it often figured in our 
discussions with the migrant workers: their experience of moving away from home in search 
	
6 ‘Riders for NREGA: Challenges of backward districts.’ Available at   
http://nrega.nic.in/Planning_Commision.pdf. Accessed on 26 January 2019. 
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of work allows them to offer the informed opinion that Jharkhand is ‘the poorest state in 
India’. 
There are 148 households in Dumka’s Jharatti village—39 Muslim, 58 Santal, 20 
Lohars, and the rest a mixture of service castes. Of these 148 households, slightly more than 
half report having family members who migrate seasonally to find work in other states. In the 
past, the mainstay of the local economy in Dumka District was agriculture. The Santals and 
the Lohars, who make up the majority of the population in Jharatti village, continue to hold 
small sizes of land—three to five acres for a typical family—on which they are able to grow 
one crop of rice or corn. Demographic growth has meant that landholdings are getting 
increasingly fragmented. While most of these families grow enough rice to be self-sufficient, 
there are a few, who manage to produce a surplus for sale. Those families, who own no land, 
may provide labour for transplanting rice and for cutting the harvest, but this agricultural 
labour is available for less than 60 days each year, and the rates of pay—130 rupees for 
women workers and 150 to 200 rupees for men—are low. 
Farmers in Jharatti spoke of declining rainfall and the fall in the level of the water 
table that have made irrigation unaffordable. They described the presence of kala patthar 
(black rock) and of ground having become hot and hard, which prevented rain water from 
percolating. In the words of one informant: ‘Barish nahi to kheti nahi, to kya kareh?’ 
(Without rain, there is no farming, so what to do?). In truth, alternatives are limited. Local 
opportunities for unskilled manual labour—building houses, baking bricks or constructing 
roads—pay no more than agricultural work. No one reported getting any of the 100 days of 
work which the NREGA (National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005)7 scheme 
guarantees. Nor have those who belong to the Scheduled Tribes been able to gain the 
	
7 ‘The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA).’ Available at 
http://nrega.nic.in/rajaswa.pdf. Accessed on 01 February 2019. 
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government jobs supposedly reserved for them. Out of the slightly more than 700 adults who 
inhabit Jharatti, there is only one who is a teacher, and three others, who have joined the 
police. For most people in Jharatti, the only source of income is selling their labour on a short 
term, casual basis. Each day, a few men from Jharatti might walk or cycle to the bazaar 
(market) in Dumka town. Here, they would stand in a junction near the bus stand hoping that 
a mistri (the main worker) will select them for some construction work. This may pay a little 
more, in some cases, as much as 230 rupees per day, but is not available on a regular basis, 
and not at all during the monsoon months. In short, the lack of local employment 
opportunities, divided landholdings, declining rainfall, falling groundwater level, and higher 
wages in other regions, have combined to create a situation, in which seasonal migration has 
become the primary source of income for many families. 
Roy (2008), Rao (2006) and De Haan (2002) have described migration out of the 
erstwhile bigger Bihar, as having a history dating back at least 100 years. In the late 19th 
century, people were leaving the hills and jungles of Chotanagpur to work on railway and 
road-building projects in West Bengal and Burma, mills in Bombay, and in tea plantations in 
Assam. Adivasi workers from this region had also migrated to the colonial plantations in the 
Caribbean, Fiji and South Africa (Roy 2008). Rogaly et al (2003) recount how since colonial 
times, farmers from West Bengal travelled to Jharkhand to recruit seasonal labour. A more 
recent migration stream took large numbers of male workers from Jharkhand to India’s 
Himalayan borders, where they were employed by the General Reserve Engineer 
Force (GREF) to build roads. A range of other opportunities have drawn workers away from 
Jharkhand in recent decades; in Jharatti, we found people who had found temporary 
employment in the construction sector in Delhi and Bangalore, had processed meat in Pune, 
served in dhabas (roadside restaurants) in Ladakh, and worked in textile factories in Surat. 
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More recently, employment in Kerala’s tea plantations has opened up a new niche for 
seasonal employment. 
Decisions, of when to migrate and for which kinds of work, reflect certain aspects of 
ascribed identity (De Haan and Rogaly 2002). Young unmarried men go to build roads, and 
groups of women led by a senior male relative might do agricultural work in West Bengal. 
However, our village survey of Jharatti showed that across ethnic, caste and religious groups, 
the proportions of households, for whom migration forms part of their household economy, 
remain relatively consistent: across Muslim, Santal and Lohar households, a figure of 50 per 
cent is maintained. Men are more likely to migrate than women. Those who migrate might be 
landless but are equally likely to own land. 
Conversations in Jharatti revealed that migration is facilitated by a range of kinship 
ties—collateral, marital and affinal—but also through non-kin ties of friendship and 
association. Randall Kuhn (2003) has described how rural–urban migration in Bangladesh 
has created forms of social exchange for which ‘identities that had little meaning in the local 
context are mobilised to foster new and important relationships’ (2003: 312). Rogaly et al 
suggest similar processes are at work in Jharkhand: ‘As people interact with others from 
distant places, they move away from the narrower, within-group, identifications characteristic 
of village life’ (2003: 308). We would agree that migration has created a collective identity, 
that of the Jharkhandi migrant labourer, that functions above and beyond affiliations of caste, 
religious or ethnic differences to enable potential workers to find work and a place to live. 
Certainly, it was not considered unusual for individuals from different social groups to form a 
collective ‘community of migration’, able to travel, live and work together. Broad affinities to 
a Jharkhandi migrant identity shape relations between workers and are deployed 
instrumentally when interacting with employers. 
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The varied sectors and locations, in which work may be found, derives from, and in 
turn contributes, to the store of knowledge about nation-wide job markets that has 
accumulated at the village level: information circulates between villagers, opportunities are 
noted, experiences compared, and new possibilities generated. Bound up with ties that are 
formed in the village, colonies of Jharkhandi labourers—whether in Kerala, Kashmir, 
Bombay or Gujarat—share common senses of identity and store of knowledge but also a of a 
moral relationship that places great emphasis on equality and solidarity. 
In the next section, we look in greater detail at circular migration from Jharkhand to 
the tea estates of Kerala. Here, we focus on the arrival of migrant labourers to the tea 
plantations of Peermade and explain the role of intermediaries in facilitating their 
employment. Examining in turn the respective positions of migrant workers, professional 
labour contractors, worker-agents and the management of the tea company, we are able to 
evaluate the manner, in which forms of knowledge work to shape recruitment arrangements. 
 
V 
The rise and fall of the labour contractor in Kerala’s Peermade tea belt 
Known as the ‘tea pot of Kerala’, Peermade is one of the most important tea producing 
regions in South India: 36 individual estates cover 10,000 hectares in the Western Ghats. Tea 
plantations were first established in the area in the 1860s, when colonial bureaucrats and 
merchants realised the potential for large-scale cash crop cultivation in the Western Ghats. 
Initially to convert forest area into plantations and then to pluck and process tea leaves, 
workers, from ‘untouchable’ castes, were recruited from the Tamil speaking region of South 
India through a system of indenture. The recruitment of fellow Tamils was made easier by the 
long history of migration from this area to plantations in other parts of the world such as Sri 
Lanka and South Africa. Under the Kangani system, potential recruits would be offered an 
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advance which was made against wages they could earn from future labour (Guilmoto 1993). 
Once at the plantations, they had to work under the strict class order. The workers were 
divided into labour gangs under the Kangani who recruited them and was now responsible for 
supervising and paying them. The labour gangs worked for Kanganis as the wage was 
directly paid by Kangani. Thus, Tamil Kanganis in the Peermade tea belt played the role of 
perfect mediator who acted as a bridge and broker between the plantation company and the 
workers. A similar system operated in the plantations of north-east India though in that areas 
upper-caste Bengali supervisors were called ‘sardars’ and mainly recruited a workforce of 
Adivasis from the highlands of Nepal and the Chotanagpur plateau (Roy 2008). In some 
respects, this Kangani/Sardari system—based on ties formed in the site of recruitment—could 
be claimed as the predecessor of the current worker-agent. However, the contemporary 
worker-agents introduced in this article combine their recruitment activities with manual 
wage labour alongside those they recruit. The contemporary worker-agent therefore lacks the 
authority and supervisory status that Kanganis and Sardars were accustomed to in the past. 
Tamil dalits and their descendants formed the majority of the labour force in Kerala’s 
tea belt for over a century. Then, in the early 1990s, a severe economic crisis crippled the tea 
industry in India. The downturn was triggered by competition from Kenya and Sri Lanka and 
by the loss of Indian tea market in Russia and Iraq following the collapse of the USSR and 
the Gulf war respectively. Many plantations were closed; and in those that survived, the crisis 
provided a pretext for companies to reduce wages and withdraw the relatively generous social 
provisions their workers had previously enjoyed. Plantations’ closures and stagnating wages 
forced many workers to seek employments outside of the tea industry. Although they still 
form the majority of the labour force, their presence in the tea belt has undergone a drastic 
decline: in the case of the Hill View estate, the number of permanent workers fell from 1100 
in the late 1980s to just 232 only two decades later. Consequently, when the estate returned to 
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normal functioning by the beginning of 2011, they faced a significant shortage of labour. To 
resolve the shortage of labour, especially for the plucking of tea leaves, attempts were made 
to (re)hire retired and temporary workers from crisis-ridden estates nearby. But a few former 
Tamil workers were willing to return as casual labourers—aware that they would get no 
social security benefits—for daily wages of Rs 189. The company needed new sources of 
labour; it was found in East and Central India. 
 
A bridge that charges toll at both ends 
By the end of 2011, migrant workers from central and eastern India began to arrive to take up 
work in the plantations of Peermade. Assamese Muslims formed the majority of the new 
migrant workforce for the KABS and CMT tea companies, while workers from Odisha were 
recruited into smaller estates producing tea, coffee and cardamom. However, it was migrant 
workers from Jharkhand—approximately 200 men and women from Dumka and Godda 
districts—who came to form the majority of the workforce of the AUBURN company. Of the 
72 families from Jharkhand working in the AUBURN’s three estates, we will here 
concentrate on the 30 families plus another 12 individuals (a total of 57 workers) who were 
working at AUBURN’s Top View estate during the early part of 2015. 
It was Thomas—the Syrian Christian contractor from the valley town of 
Thodupuzha—who first brought these Jharkhandi workers to the AUBURN company. 
Thomas had been introduced to the manager of AUBURN by a member of the managerial 
staff, who was his long-term friend. The Company instructed Thomas to recruit 100 workers 
without preference for the ethnicity or social origin of the workforce. Using the connections 
he had established with Syrian Christian missionaries in Jharkhand, Thomas initially brought 
in around 40 workers from Jharatti in Dumka District and from the village of Sakri over the 
border in Godda District. For each worker he delivered to the plantation, Thomas received a 
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commission besides the reimbursement of his expenses on food and transportation of the 
workers. In addition to this, the plantation company paid Thomas a commission of Rs 20 per 
worker per day. This, apparently, was not enough. Thomas negotiated an agreement with the 
management that the migrant workers’ wages should be transferred directly to his bank 
account every month, allowing him to distribute the payment to his workers. From these 
minimum legal wages, Thomas now subtracted a further Rs 20 commission for himself, 
leaving the daily pay passed on to the workers at just Rs 169. As a bridge, Thomas connected 
two sides and charged tolls at both ends. 
The double commission that Thomas was able to generate derived from his ability to 
mediate between employers and workers. At a social level, Thomas had friendships with 
individuals serving in management positions at the tea company. From these connections, 
Thomas would have gained an understanding of the economics of tea production, and, once 
alerted to their need to hire new workers, of how much they would be willing to pay for it. 
Thomas’s knowledge of Jharkandi potential workers was of a different order. Introduced to 
them by some fellow Syrian Christians, Thomas understood that these people from rural 
Jharkhand were prepared to work for low rates of pay. To Thomas, ‘Jharkhandi migrants’ 
were all of one class: a homogenous mass of workers available for easy exploitation. The 
biggest problem Thomas faced was ensuring that these workers stayed long enough at the 
plantation to make his efforts worthwhile—the stereotypical Jharkhandi was unreliable and 
known for absconding for home when they were most needed at the plantation. 
After having recruited the migrant workers, Thomas showed little interest in their 
activities or needs once they reached Kerala. Thomas travelled to the plantation only to 
distribute the wages—seldom regularly—to the workers. Sometimes, the workers had to wait 
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even for two months to receive their pay.8 A Tamil worker, whom we interviewed, told us 
that ‘it was like a festival day for the migrant workers, when they saw Thomas coming with 
their money’. Thomas used ‘delay in payment’ as a means to control workers: those who left 
the plantation early went unpaid. However, because he rarely visited the plantation, he 
understood little of the problems arising there. 
The role of labour contractor to the Hill Top estate provided Thomas with a handsome 
income. However, despite the tables seemingly being stacked decisively against the 
Jharkhandi workers, Thomas’s position as a contractor was less secure than he anticipated. 
Once it was discovered that Thomas was extracting a ‘dual-commission’, his authority (trust) 
with workers was lost. The workers complained to a Tamil employee called Anthony. 
Sympathetic to the migrant workers, Anthony communicated their complaints to the field 
officer and also to the manager of the estate. At first, the manager told the migrant workers 
that there is an agreement between the company and Thomas, which could not be broken. 
However, the workers continued to raise their concerns and finally threatened to leave the 
plantations unless Thomas was taken out from the role of mediation. With Thomas’s 
duplicity now made public, the company risked alienating the labour force they had come to 
rely upon since losing their Tamil workers. Thomas was quickly cut off—deemed expendable 
by the company. Reneging on their ‘gentleman’s agreement’, the manager of the Hill View 
estate told Thomas that he could no longer act as contractor with the excuse that he did not 
meet the legal requirement of being registered with the Labour Office in the Peermade tea 
belt. Thus, Thomas was abandoned by both, the migrant workers and the company. Thomas’s 
super-exploitation of the migrant workers and overconfident sense of indispensability 
resulted in his downfall. 
	
8 Each week, the company gave each worker an advance of Rs 150 to cover expenses. This 
‘store cash’ (in Tamil, chelavukasu) would be deducted from their monthly wages paid to 
Thomas.  
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Losing Thomas, the mediator, created a vacuum. This was to be filled by the figure of 
the worker-agent, who met the requirements of—bridge, broker and buffer—by mediating 
between the needs of workers and employers in new ways. In the next section, we look at 
some of the individuals, who took on the role of worker-agent, and consider how different 
forms of knowledge came to constitute the basis for the recruitment and retention of the 
migrant workforce. 
 
Knowledge, trust and the worker-agent 
After Thomas’s exit, the company was concerned about the difficulties in recruiting new 
labourers to the plantations. The migrant workers themselves proved to be the answer to the 
company’s problem. The first individual to take up the possibility to step into the contractor’s 
shoes was Sagar—a Santali from Jharkhand’s Godda District, who had been brought to Hill 
View by Thomas. Sagar told us, how in February 2013, the company management had 
approached him with the offer of a bonus for each additional worker he recruited to the 
plantation. After a short visit back to Jharkhand, Sagar returned with 16 new workers 
including his wife, his sister’s husband and his nephew. His reward was a payment of Rs 5 
per person for each day they remained on the plantation. But Sagar was not satisfied with the 
commission the company gave him. Concerned that Sagar might pull out his workers and 
move them to another estate, the company responded in two ways. In October 2014, the 
company upped the commission with an offer of Rs 7 per day per worker plus a one-off 
payment of Rs 1000 to cover the costs of food and transportation. The company also devised 
a strategy of extending this offer to other worker-agents. When the company made this new 
offer, two of Thomas’s recruits—Rooplal and Ramadhar—stepped in promising to the 
company to bring in more workers. Rooplal, a 40-year-old college dropout, jumped at the 
means to make more money. Unlike Rooplal, 50-year-old Ramadhar had never been to 
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school; but he had good village-level connections having served on the community council in 
the village. Within a week of company’s announcement of the offer, both Rooplal and 
Ramadhar travelled to their native villages to recruit additional workers. Rooplal brought in 
nine workers while Ramadhar brought in 11—mostly relatives and friends. The fourth 
migrant worker who took the chance to act as a worker-agent was Ashok Rana, who had kin 
living in Sakri too. In a series of interviews with these four individuals, we learned more 
about the shift from the sardari (chief-led) to the ristedari (kinship-based) model of 
recruitment. In all these interviews, much emphasis was placed on the importance of 
particular forms of knowledge that underpinned the performance of their new roles as 
worker-agents. 
A look into the history of labour migration out of Jharkhand shows that the 
importance of labour contractor in other forms of circular migration tends to weaken over 
time. Heidemann (1992), Das Gupta (1992), and Sen (2010) document shifts from vertical 
systems of recruitment to horizontal friendship/kinship-based arrangements. In the initial 
stages, the contractor holds a monopoly of knowledge about receiving destination, the forms 
of work available, and the terms of conditions that may be negotiated. This would certainly 
seem to be true in the case of Thomas and the migrant workers he brought to the Hill View 
estate. Initially Thomas’s role as bridge and broker was reinforced by the Jharkhandi 
workers’ unfamiliarity with plantation work in Kerala and ignorance of Tamil or Malayalam. 
However, over time, these migrant workers were able to acquire knowledge about the very 
different social and linguistic settings of the Peermade Tea belt.9 Ten months after their 
	
9Venkiteswaran (2017) describes the sharing of jokes and gossip among migrant workers 
leaving Kerala to return home to Odisha and Bengal. Communicated through social and 
kinship networks, these migrant narratives stereotype the Malayalees’ obsession with 
personal cleanliness and general aversion to manual work. These same networks have 
facilitated the spread of valuable knowledge about the tea production process, the 
administration of the plantations and job availability. 
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arrival, the likes of Ashok Rana, Ramadhar, Rooplal and Sagar had acquired knowledge of 
the needs, negotiating strategies and trustworthiness of the tea company. Though never as in-
depth in their understanding as Thomas, this knowledge was enough to engage with the 
individual managers. The acquisition of these particular types of knowledge allowed worker-
agents to begin to negotiate with potential employers about the supply of migrant labour to 
the plantations. 
The role of professional labour contractors such as Thomas also depends on the 
accumulation of knowledge about their workforce. Here, worker-agents have an advantage: 
their knowledge being innate to their social network, they are better able to maintain the 
supply of labour to companies through an awareness of who wants or needs work, who is 
likely to work well, and who can be depended upon to be reliable. In contrast to professional 
contractors, worker-agents possess wide and deep knowledge of the economic and social 
situation in home villages—they know who has land and who does not (and what this means 
for seasonal availability); they are also able to differentiate the balance of occupations within 
each household (and thus the degree, to which fellow villagers are dependent on maintaining 
some income from working on the plantation). Knowledge of the family backgrounds of 
potential workers (marital status, dependents and their ages) is another means by which their 
reliability can be judged. This social knowledge even extends to whether a marriage is a 
happy one. In one story we heard, a wife demanded that her husband come with her to Kerala 
because she started doubting that he might have been having an affair. 
Another significant distinction between worker-agents and professional labour 
contractors is that the former continue with manual work alongside those they have recruited. 
As such, they remain integrated in the kinship/friendship network that supports them and 
forms the basis of the system of recruitment. Worker-agents, unlike the professional 
contractors, are more likely to have the knowledge of the problems in the personal lives of 
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the workers and can make attempts to help them. Furthermore, social expectations based on 
long-standing relations established back in the village could be used to persuade the recruits 
not to leave and remain as ‘ideal’ workers. Compared with the crude withholding of wages by 
the professional contractor, the worker-agent’s knowledge of social context provides a subtler 
and more sophisticated tool to ensure conformity and commitment. As worker-agents live 
and work alongside those whom they recruit, they are more responsive to labour issues than 
the distant Thomas living in the valley town of Thodupuzha. However, initially at least, the 
worker-agents struggled to know who to communicate these problems to. However, once a 
new management structure was implemented (the Tamil Anthony was appointed as a go-
between), the lives of the migrant workers improved with more regular payment of wages 
and advances to buy food and warm clothing. 
The transition from professional contractor to worker-agent is described as a shift 
from the sardari system to ristedari system of recruitment. To put it another way, Thomas’s 
hierarchical relationship as professional labour contractor was replaced by a horizontal 
system conditioned by kinship and friendship network. Although Ashok Rana, Sagar, Rooplal 
and Ramadhar became, in effect, recruitment agents, neither the company nor their fellow 
workers viewed them as sardars who must be obeyed. The individuals who took on the role 
of worker-agent were, for the most part, respected members of their communities. 
Consequently (and again in stark contrast to Thomas), while they might accept a commission 
from the company, it would be viewed as a social transgression to take the same from their 
fellow workers, who were also friends and family. In a way, those who have close links with 
the workers are more likely to be successful as recruiters. They are also more likely to get the 
balance right between support and exploitation, which Thomas had fatally miscalculated. 
Since the worker-agents continued to be workers, they were able to project themselves as part 
of the exploited Jharkhandi migrant community unlike Thomas, who was viewed as an 
From labour contractors to worker-agents 
23	
	
exploiter. However, it appears that there existed, from the start, soft conflicts among the 
worker-agents to become the dominant recruiter. Using their own connections to assert their 
own dominance, this competition within the worker-agent group required them to maintain 
relatively decent relations within the migrant workforce. Thomas, being the only agent, was 
able to act as a saab or sardar. But the rise of worker-agents resulted in democratisation of the 
relation between the recruiter and the recruited. 
It is instructive to consider what happens on those rare occasions when a worker-
agent has tried to become a dictator like Thomas. We were told by other workers that Sagar, 
after his initial success, started to refer to himself as sardar. This was followed by an 
accusation on him, of sexual harassment of a migrant woman. Consequently, although Sagar 
continued to bring immediate family members to the plantation, those who were not so close 
to him opted to transfer over to worker-agents such as Ashok Rana, whose own social 
networks overlapped with their own. Such transitions were mediated by the representative of 
the plantation management. The same horizontal knowledge system that underpinned wide-
ranging recruitment networks both depend upon and maintain an egalitarian structure where 
trust ensures loyalty and commitment. Those who try to rise above it to become contractors 
(like Sagar) are cut down. 
 
VI 
Optimal ignorance and knowledge: The benefits for the company 
Having outlined the contrasting manner, by which professional labour contractors and 
worker-agents manage to supply labour to the Peermade tea estates, our attention now turns 
to the management of the plantations, to consider their motivation in accepting shifts in 
systems of recruitment. Initially, the recruitment of Jharkhandi migrants through professional 
contractors such as Thomas appealed to the plantation companies for a number of reasons. 
First, the new migrant workers were cheap; they were prepared to accept the minimum wage 
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rates that the previous Tamil workforce had largely rejected. Furthermore, being employed on 
temporary bases, they were not entitled to the same social security and welfare measures that 
were available to the Tamils, who were directly and permanently employed by the company. 
The need for plantation labour spikes twice a year—during the peak plucking seasons—from 
January to March, and August to October. Second, the supply of labour can be matched to 
these twin peaks without the need for workers to be kept on in the slack intervening months. 
That the flow of Jharkhandi workers could be turned up or down according to demand was 
hugely important to the companies. Having the contractor as a buffer, the workers could be 
easily abandoned in the event of a crisis in future. 
The third motive for using Thomas as an intermediary—and the one that largely 
explains the first two—is that doing so allowed the plantation company to ignore legal rights 
supposedly due to all workers. By using contractors as intermediaries, employers are able to 
avoid legal responsibilities to labour, for example, the implementation of The Plantations 
Labour Act10 of 1951. Legally, casual labour can be used only to fulfil tasks outside the daily 
routine of the plantations, for example, cutting of trees. In fact, Jharkhandis of both sexes 
were engaged in tea plucking; men were also employed in routine ‘factory’ work such as 
filling tea leaves into large drums for the crushing machines and carrying the processed tea to 
the packaging area. Using the contractor as a buffer, plantation companies were able to deny 
to their migrant labourers ‘permanent worker’ status and accompanying benefits including 
provident fund access, paid annual holidays and medical leave. On any of these grounds, the 
recognised trade unions and government officials (such as Inspector of Plantations, and 
Deputy Labour Officer) could have intervened in support of the casualised migrant 
workforce. They chose not to do so. Trade unions in the tea belt are rarely concerned about 
	
10 ‘The Plantations Labour Act, 1951.’ Available at  
https://labour.gov.in/sites/default/files/The-Plantation-Labour-Act-1951.pdf. Accessed on 31 
January 2019. 
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the exploitative situation of the new migrant workforce, and the benefits of membership have 
not been extended to the casual migrant workforce. 
Initially at least, the plantation companies were happy with this arrangement—with 
Thomas as an intermediary, they hoped that to ensure a reliable supply of workers, for whom 
further employment required them to remain compliant. However, while neoliberal 
conditions contributed to the initial creation of the niche exploited by Thomas, what 
happened at the Hill View plantation confirms De Neve’s view that the same conditions 
ultimately ‘tend to undermine rather than enhance contractors’ entrepreneurial success and to 
reduce rather than intensify their power vis-à-vis both capital and workers’ (De Neve 2014: 
1306). 
Why did the company agree to shift from contractor-led recruitment to make 
arrangements via worker-agents? The immediate cause was a concern that following their 
falling out with Thomas, the migrant labourers might quit the plantation and return to 
Jharkhand. The company quickly recognised that it is preferable to negotiate with multiple 
worker-agents than with a single contractor like Thomas. Furthermore, the worker-agents’ 
superior understanding of the situation of potential workers and their extended social 
networks in recruiting areas mean that they are able to respond to changes in demand, and 
deliver a reliable supply of workers. Even better, as far as the company was concerned, these 
new recruitment agents were largely unfamiliar with the kinds of bargaining strategies used 
by employers when negotiating rates of pay. No longer reliant on a single contractor, the 
company could spread risks while reducing labour costs (compare the Rs 7 per worker per 
day paid to worker-agents to the Rs 20 per worker per day paid to professional contractors). 
The Jharkhandis were better and cheaper than Thomas, and could recruit new labourers 
quickly and easily. Moreover, one might assume that the worker-agents would side with their 
fellow Jharkhandis the event of a dispute, but in actuality, individual worker-agents were 
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reluctant to challenge the company for the fear of being sidelined or dismissed. For the 
company, the figure of the worker-agent has come to play a vital role in the ongoing making 
and remaking of labour markets. 
While the rise of worker-agents provided many advantages for the plantation 
company, the absence of a professional contractor did expose new tensions in the relationship 
between the workforce and the company. Previously, the professional contractor would 
represent the workers and raise their concerns with the management. The company did not 
want to parley with worker-agents in the same way—to do so would threaten the class order 
within the plantation. The increasing casualisation of work is supported by the complex 
mechanism of labour recruitment devised by the tea company; new layers of management 
handle the outsourcing of labour recruitment to worker-agents while simultaneously reducing 
the power of these agents to bargain on behalf of the workforce. The AUBURN company 
chose to refigure the labour hierarchy on the Hill View estate by deploying the Tamil 
Anthony to act as a mediator between the new migrant workforce and the field officer of the 
estate. Previously, Thomas would have to be contacted every time the company wanted to 
make a decision over the workers’ situation. Now, without upsetting the plantation hierarchy, 
the workers’ concerns and complaints and the company’s decisions could be communicated 
directly to the Hindi-speaking Anthony. On their arrival to the plantation, Anthony would 
take charge over the new workers, helping them to settle in the plantation. Through Anthony, 
it was agreed that the company would pay an advance to buy groceries, warm clothes and the 
tools needed for work.11 By appointing an informal liaison officer, the company denied 
further status and power to worker-agents, preventing them from gaining knowledge about 
	
11 The company has arrangements with various shops in nodal towns, from which workers 
can purchase groceries and other necessary things for the first month. However, to do so, they 
must be accompanied by a supervisor, who is required to approve the items and the bill. The 
amount spent is deducted from workers’ wages over the next four or five months.  
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company’s economic interests, and discouraged them from organising the workers against the 
company. Anthony was fondly called mama (maternal uncle) by the migrant workers; the 
company cleverly exploited this close relationship and the workers’ vulnerability to exert 
control over the new labour force.  
VII 
Conclusion: From labour contractor to worker-agent 
In this article, we have seen how the organisation of migration to Kerala’s tea estates has 
changed from a hierarchical contractor-led system of recruitment to one in which worker-
agents bring friends and family to work with them in the plantations. The figure of the 
worker-agent in the migration dynamics has to be understood, not as an offshoot or parallel 
system of labour recruitment, but as a major system that potentially replaces the professional 
contractors/commission agents. 
With worker-agents becoming able to quickly mobilise a reliable workforce, their 
deployment allows tea companies in Peermade to manage levels of demand for labourers 
without having to employ workers on permanent basis. The shift to a ristedari recruitment 
system widened the company’s recruitment strategies while allowing them to remain distant 
from the casual workforce and its representatives. In other words, the balance of knowledge 
and ignorance was optimised in favour of the employer and against the worker-agents and 
temporary migrant workers. These transformations have important implications for the 
bridging, brokering and buffering functions of labour recruitment as demonstrated in Table 1: 
Table 1: Comparison between professional labour contractors and worker-agents 
Role Labour contractors Worker-agents 
Bridge (facilitating 
initial contact 
between workers and 
employers) 
Based on asymmetrical 
knowledge: workers and prime 
employers are unaware of one 
another; professional contactors 
know the terms of employment 
offered by companies and the 
Since contact has already been 
made, the worker-agent has no 
role in introducing the two 
parties. Instead, the worker 
agent’s role comes from 
continually maintaining the 
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willingness of labour to work for 
them.  
bridge.  
Broker (maintaining 
flexible supply of 
labour to meet 
varying demands of 
employer) 
1. Supply of labour: The 
professional contractors use 
networks created professionally. 
They need to accumulate 
knowledge of the workforce to 
maintain the supply of labour. 
 
2. Maintaining labour: 
Contractor is not located at place 
of work and lacks awareness of 
social relations of workers. 
 
3. Contractor maintains control 
through economic coercions, 
such as withholding wages and 
arrears and refusing to provide 
further employment 
opportunities to those who try to 
leave without his consent. 
 
4. Company-friendly operator. 
The priority is always the 
company. The professional 
contractor is not a threat to the 
company. 
 
5. Cost is high 
1. Supply of labour: Worker-
agent have a superior ability to 
maintain supply of labour 
through extended social 
networks (awareness of who 
wants/needs work). Their 
knowledge is innate to their 
social network. 
 
2. Maintaining labour: Worker-
agent maintains control over 
workers through social 
expectation, which extend back 
to the village. A subtler and 
sophisticated form of control 
compared to that of the 
professional contractor. 
 
3. Company appoints an 
informal liaison officer to work 
alongside worker-agent to keep 
the worker-agent away from 
acquiring further status and 
power, and also from organising 
the workers against the 
company. 
 
4. Cost is low 
Buffer (allowing 
employers to avoid 
legal responsibilities)  
Professional contractor is the de 
jure employer—has 
responsibility for workers and 
pays their wages. Allows 
company to avoid 
responsibilities.  
Following crisis—company has 
greater freedom to violate or 
ignore employment legislations 
and regulations. Rights are 
commonly denied to all staff 
(whether permanent or casual, 
local or migrant). No need to use 
contractors as a buffer to avoid 
responsibilities.  
 
Source: Authors 
 
Looking at the different aspects of the contractors’ role—as bridge, broker and buffer—we 
can see how changes in the relative positions and needs of labour and capital contribute to the 
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process, by which contractors are replaced by worker-agents. We have shown how shifts in 
recruitment systems illustrate certain features of contemporary global capitalism that relies on 
the continuous creation of a precarious casual labour force. In some small ways, the shift 
away from contractor-led recruitment has benefitted the migrant workers, who are paid more 
regularly and are able to communicate problems more easily; more substantial benefits have 
accrued to the worker-agent who commands a bonus payment from the labour of fellow-
migrants. But the biggest winner has proved to be the plantation companies—with the 
bridging role established, the use of worker-agents instead of professional contractors has 
resulted in lower overall costs, the securing of a flexible and reliable supply of labourers, and 
the continued denial to casual workers of their legal dues. It may be possible that in the 
horizontal social networks that facilitated the rise of the worker-agents, there exist the 
possibility for political struggle and collective negotiation to further improve the position of 
migrant labour. This can be helped in a stronger way if the existing trade unions and 
government labour officials intervene. However, this seems unlikely for now. 
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